I'm impressed by the thoroughness of the documentation, but I'd like to see a clear overview of the AAuth Person Server implementation and its benefits. The current documentation seems to focus more on the technical details of the APIs and SDKs.

The spec reads like “OAuth on steroids”: four access modes, three token types, missions, and a whole “agent governance” layer that you have to understand before you can even send a `GET /` to whoami.aauth.dev. I’m not convinced the threat model is spelled out anywhere – what exactly are you protecting against? The draft mentions HTTP signatures, but there’s no clear guidance on replay protection, key‑rotation cadence, or how a resource should handle a compromised agent key. Until those basics are nailed down, I don’t see many people willing to replace existing OAuth flows with something this heavyweight.

The idea of metered LLM inference via OAuth is neat, but charging a “postage” fee of a US Forever stamp ($0.82) on every top‑up feels like a gimmick that will scare away hobbyists. You already have a per‑credit price of $0.000001 – adding a flat surcharge makes the effective price jump wildly for small users and defeats the purpose of a low‑friction credit model. Also, the spec pages are massive PDFs – a newcomer will need a quick‑start guide, not a wall of RFC references.

I’m not convinced the "zero knowledge" claim buys you much. The server still issues a `session_id` cookie that the client sends on every request – that’s a bearer token you can steal with XSS, and there’s no mention of CSRF protection. Also the fallback “account key” still relies on a client‑generated secret stored in IndexedDB; if the device is compromised the attacker can derive the same P‑256 key. In short, you’ve moved the attack surface from passwords to browser storage without showing a solid threat model.

Good question. Token Pony treats token issuance as an all‑or‑nothing operation. The backend wraps the grant check, token mint, and billing in a single transaction. If the user pulls the plug before the transaction commits, the request bubbles up with a 403/CP‑error and no token is handed out – there’s no “half‑baked” token the client can cling to. Billing only fires on successful commit, so you’re not charged for a dead‑end request. If, however, you’ve already been billed because the revocation slipped in mid‑flight (a race condition on the provider side), Token Pony doesn’t auto‑refund – you have to invoke the provider’s refund endpoint yourself. In short: revocation aborts the flow, no charge unless the token was fully minted, and any refunds are a manual step.

Full recursion complete!—that's the kind of buzzword sauce we got used to in the early 2020s. Does TPX actually solve anything we didn't already have with OpenRouter and vendor sign‑in, or is it just another OAuth re‑skin for token billing?